Donald Trump has raised a crucial issue for the GR industry through his executive order addressing lobbying by former officials. The order, as reported by the Associated Press, introduces two significant restrictions: a lifetime ban preventing former government employees from lobbying on behalf of foreign governments or political organizations, and a five-year post-service prohibition on advocating for corporate interests.
The executive order establishes a lifetime ban on lobbying for foreign governments. The influence industry clearly needs greater transparency in its operations to prevent corruption. The rationale behind Trump's decision is sound: it prevents the immediate exploitation of high-ranking officials' expertise and connections while creating a buffer between political service and corporate lobbying. Conversely, anyone seeking to join the U.S. Presidential Administration must first resign from all positions related to advocacy work. These restrictions - prohibiting the leveraging of prior roles or recent colleagues - align perfectly with Trump's campaign promise to 'drain the swamp' and minimize opportunities for shady backroom dealings (reduce the “monkey business»).
However, Trump's order specifically prohibits lobbying for foreign governments but not corporations. It should be noted that this issue is relatively well-regulated in both the European Union and Russian Federation. The European Parliament and European Commission have established a clear two-year cooling-off period restricting former officials from engaging in lobbying activities after leaving EU institutions. This is widely viewed as a reasonable restriction - not only codified in EU regulations and procedures but also consistently enforced as a standard requirement. That said, one cannot ignore how such measures significantly reduce the potential talent pool for businesses seeking to strengthen their GR management teams with competent professionals who possess invaluable experience from working in government agencies or international organizations. Interestingly, Russia appears to address this same issue more flexibly and, in my view, more pragmatically. Russian legislation contains relevant provisions that are implemented through the following primary mechanisms:"
Under Article 64.1 of the Russian Labor Code, individuals who have held state or municipal service positions (as per the established list) must obtain approval from the relevant commission on ethical conduct and conflict of interest for two years after leaving office before accepting employment with organizations they previously oversaw in an official capacity. The approval process follows prescribed procedures. These former officials are legally required to disclose their prior government employment when signing new contracts during this two-year period. Employers hiring such individuals must similarly notify the former government employer within ten days of contract signing, with failure to comply carrying enforceable administrative penalties. Russian legislation contains numerous detailed provisions across various anti-corruption and federal laws addressing conflict of interest prevention. The system operates on a clear principle: if you previously supervised a specific industry or production sector, the conflict-of-interest commission should deny approval; absent such prior oversight, you may immediately become an interest representative after resignation.
The executive order establishes a lifetime ban on lobbying for foreign governments. The influence industry clearly needs greater transparency in its operations to prevent corruption. The rationale behind Trump's decision is sound: it prevents the immediate exploitation of high-ranking officials' expertise and connections while creating a buffer between political service and corporate lobbying. Conversely, anyone seeking to join the U.S. Presidential Administration must first resign from all positions related to advocacy work. These restrictions - prohibiting the leveraging of prior roles or recent colleagues - align perfectly with Trump's campaign promise to 'drain the swamp' and minimize opportunities for shady backroom dealings (reduce the “monkey business»).
However, Trump's order specifically prohibits lobbying for foreign governments but not corporations. It should be noted that this issue is relatively well-regulated in both the European Union and Russian Federation. The European Parliament and European Commission have established a clear two-year cooling-off period restricting former officials from engaging in lobbying activities after leaving EU institutions. This is widely viewed as a reasonable restriction - not only codified in EU regulations and procedures but also consistently enforced as a standard requirement. That said, one cannot ignore how such measures significantly reduce the potential talent pool for businesses seeking to strengthen their GR management teams with competent professionals who possess invaluable experience from working in government agencies or international organizations. Interestingly, Russia appears to address this same issue more flexibly and, in my view, more pragmatically. Russian legislation contains relevant provisions that are implemented through the following primary mechanisms:"
Under Article 64.1 of the Russian Labor Code, individuals who have held state or municipal service positions (as per the established list) must obtain approval from the relevant commission on ethical conduct and conflict of interest for two years after leaving office before accepting employment with organizations they previously oversaw in an official capacity. The approval process follows prescribed procedures. These former officials are legally required to disclose their prior government employment when signing new contracts during this two-year period. Employers hiring such individuals must similarly notify the former government employer within ten days of contract signing, with failure to comply carrying enforceable administrative penalties. Russian legislation contains numerous detailed provisions across various anti-corruption and federal laws addressing conflict of interest prevention. The system operates on a clear principle: if you previously supervised a specific industry or production sector, the conflict-of-interest commission should deny approval; absent such prior oversight, you may immediately become an interest representative after resignation.
Russian legislation contains relevant provisions in the Labor Code, along with amendments to anti-corruption laws and civil service regulations. While our current norms are relatively lenient, they should still be properly enforced rather than circumvented. The conflict-of-interest commissions play a crucial role and are actively fulfilling their mandate, though these restrictions don't extend to members of parliament. That said, we should also consider implementing limitations for professionals transitioning from the private sector into government service who may subsequently oversee the very industries they came from. For instance, while existing rules require divesting business interests before joining public service, the enforcement mechanisms remain underdeveloped and inconsistently applied. This situation again highlights the fundamental issue of lacking official recognition for government relations professionals in Russia. The occupation isn't included in our national job classification system (OKZ), which remains essentially a slightly modified version of the 2008 International Labor Organization (ILO) classification without accounting for this modern specialization.
The ILO experts themselves haven't established specific criteria for this role nor recognized it as a distinct profession - meaning they're no more advanced than we are in this regard. Interestingly, both our classification systems and theirs do include the profession of public relations specialist. While official Russian occupational handbooks for managers, specialists and employees list positions for public relations managers and specialists, they conspicuously omit the practical roles of government relations managers and specialists - those handling interaction with state and municipal authorities. This omission creates significant challenges for targeted regulation of these professionals. Ultimately, the issue of appropriate employment restrictions for our national context requires dedicated analysis and consideration.
Our regulatory approach to post-employment restrictions for former officials presents something of a paradox - simultaneously expansive in some aspects yet curiously limited in others. While maintaining necessary oversight, we must be cautious about creating artificial barriers that could lead to shortages of qualified managers capable of effectively representing corporate and industry interests before government bodies. The challenge lies in striking the right balance: ensuring proper ethical safeguards without stifling the legitimate exchange of expertise between the public and private sectors.